Hiring Managers

(官员遴选中的激励：基于明代科举的数据挖掘)

摘要：

Two fundamental problems plague hiring for important positions: to design incentive schemes for hiring managers and to measure their performance in hiring. We develop a theoretical model to capture the hiring managers’ strategic discretion in hiring. Their private incentives induce them to increase screening efforts, which benefits both themselves and paradoxically the principal by generating the least distorted sorting outcomes. We substantiate this model using a historical dataset of 12,752 candidates who passed 46 civil service examinations (CSEs) in China between 1400 and 1580. Results show that examiners’ motivation was positively correlated with the quality of the cohort being hired.

报告时间：2025年4月15日，下午2:00        

线下地点：浙江财经大学经济学院6-210会议室

主办单位：浙江财经大学数量经济研究中心、浙江财经大学经济学院

协办单位：《财经论丛》编辑部

嘉宾介绍：

柯荣住，生于浙江苍南，浙江大学经济学学士、硕士，麻省理工学院经济学博士。从本科开始在《经济研究》、《中国社会科学》等国内各类杂志发表学术论文20余篇，其中有3篇被收入《中国经济学》系列。并在Journal of Labor Economics, Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, Management Science等国际权威刊物发表论文。