【讲座信息】

主讲人：李文健 浙江大学经济学院

主持人：吴鹏 浙江财经大学经济学院

时间：2025年3月27日（周四）14:00 - 15:30（下午）

地点：

线下：经济学院210会议室

讲座主题：

Optimal Automation

【Abstract】This paper studies the joint design of regulation, robot tax, and income tax. We establish a job assignment model with a continuum of sectors micro-founded by task-based automation. The model nicely captures the complex reaction of wages to the robot inputs in the real economy. It then studies optimal policies in the spirit of Mirrlees tax. Our findings are multifaceted. (i) We identify the endogeneity of skill premium to job assignment as a novel reason for the intervention in automation, i.e., non-optimality of production efficiency. (ii) Both robot tax and regulation are desirable. Robot tax operates through the substitution channel and regulation governs the automation channel. (iii) The regulation is concentrated for low- and middle-income sectors, where robot tax is also in place. For other sectors, subsidy to robots is desirable. (iv) Under appropriate regulation, robot tax (subsidy), ranging from -2% to 0.7%, is very low. (v) Lastly, with the advancement of technology, intervention phases out gradually, and income tax assumes a more significant redistributive role.

[主讲人简介] 浙江大学百人计划研究员，博士生导师，北京大学经济学博士。 研究领域为公共经济学及其与产业、空间与劳动经济学的交叉。基于最优税收、税负归宿与机制设计理论，研究财税制度设计。研究成果发表于 American Economic Review (accepted)， Journal of Public Economics、《经济研究》《管理世界》《经济学（季刊）》等期刊。主持2项国家自然科学基金，2项国家自科专项与社科重大子课题。