题目：An Experimental Study on Common Knowledge of Rationality and Observational Learning
In this paper, we provide a novel approach to test the implications of common knowledge of rationality in dynamic games with imperfect information. We investigate this problem by testing the notion of impartial inference in observational learning (a special form of dynamic game with imperfect information) and how lacking confidence in other people's strategic sophistication will generate information demand for cross-validating. In this experiment, we implement a classical observational learning game with different exogenous observational structures that may or may not provide access to redundant information. We control subjects' beliefs about their opponents' rationality by letting the subjects play with virtual players whose degrees of sophistication have been preprogrammed. We use different exogenous observational structure treatments to see whether redundant information helps subjects' decisions. We use endogenous observational structures to elicit participants' willingness to pay for information. We find that although there is no evidence that the redundant information helps subjects in their decision-making, they are willing to pay a higher price than predicted by equilibrium for it. We also find that overpricing is higher if subjects were previously given this information for free or if their confidence in their opponents' sophistication is low.
主讲人简介：余海晗，男，浙江财经大学经济学院讲师，主要研究领域为市场设计、行为经济学与博弈论。曾在Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations与Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics上发表文章。